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Cobden‐Chevalier  Treaty  of  1860  is  regarded  as  the  institutional  backbone  of  international 
trade policy cooperation in the second half of the nineteenth century. It consisted of more than 
fifty  bilateral  agreements  between  Western  and  Central  European  countries  that  were 
interlinked  by  the  unconditional  most‐favoured  nation  clause  (MFN).  The  resulting  level  of 
political cooperation and commercial liberalisation in Europe was unsurpassed until the coming 
of the European Economic Community and forms a key component of the idea of a European 
free  trade  era  during  the  ‘first  globalization’.  The  network  was  mainly  linked  together  by 
commercial treaties of European countries with France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy. 
An important outsider to this story was, however, Denmark. During the period of the rapid 
expansion  of  treaty‐making  in  Europe,  1860  to  1875,  Denmark  concluded  only  three 

















presented. Moreover, when  Danish trade  policy is  discussed,  it  is often  seen  as  somewhat 
irrational. Although Denmark followed others with a move towards free trade with the tariff act 
of 1863, the structure of the remaining protection seems rather illogical. This was even more so 













increased  trade  flows  –  might  be  insignificant  (Rose  2004),  while  the  core  members  who 
established  the  rules  of  the  system  and  retained  important  bargaining  power  during  its 
evolution gained significantly (Gowa and Kim 2005, Westermeier 2008). Similar results have 
been  obtained  in  recent  studies  of  the  first  round  of  the  Cobden‐Chevalier  network 
(Accominotti and Flandreau 2008, Lampe 2009a).  
Hence, for countries at the margin, the decision to cooperate or not might make only a small 











commodities  might  be  important,  taking  into  account  the  specific  production  and  export 
structure of the Danish economy, which was basically agricultural. Since it takes two to tango or 
to conclude a bilateral treaty, we also need to consider the Danish tariff from the point of view 





























































The  old  “customs  union  literature”  following  Viner  (1950)  suggests  that  trade  policy 
cooperation between two countries might be beneficial if it increases bilateral trade, and hence 
deepens  (bilateral)  division  of  labour  or  makes  more  product  varieties  available.  Scope  for 
increased division of labour results from the exploitation of differences in economic structure 
deriving from Ricardian (technological) or Heckscher‐Ohlin (factor endowment) comparative 


























who  are  concerned  about  (at  least)  balancing  additional  imports  with  additional  exports 
resulting from bilateral preferences will seek cooperation with countries of equal size first and 



























Table 1: Denmark and its trade partners 
Country  Share of Exports to 
Denmark (%) 
Share of Danish 
Exports (%) 
Share of Exports Denmark, 
Slesvig, and Holstein (%) 
Austria-Hungary  0.01  see note  see note 
Belgium  0.13 0.15  0.57 
France  0.12  0.87  0.54 
German Zollverein  n/a  8.33 (incl. ports), 
2.98 (only Prussia, 
Hannover, Lauenburg) 
41.76 (incl. ports), 
2.54 (only Prussia, Hannover, 
Lauenburg) 
Italy (any territory)  0  see note  see note 
Netherlands  0.45 3.48  3.78 
Norway  17.00  18.25  9.16 
Portugal  0.40 0  0 
Russia & Finland  3.16  1.20  0.70 
Spain  0.45 0.06  0.03 
Sweden   3.38  12.89  6.57 
Switzerland  n/a n/a  n/a 
United Kingdom  0.73  43.78  30.34 
Sources: As in Lampe (2009b), appendix 3. 
Note: For Switzerland and the Zollverein no useful data was available for contemporaneous observers, while for the 
Russian Empire the data has been taken from British consular reports which were compiled based on Russian and 
Finnish statistics. For Portugal, exports via Porto and Lisbon have been summed up, as no proper export statistics 
existed for that year. For Austria-Hungary, the share of seaward exports given in the proper statistics has been 
multiplied with the share of exports to Denmark in the statistics of the most important port, Trieste. For Denmark, 
all European ports on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea are summed up in one position whose share is 0.03% for 






prevailed  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  justifies  that  in  the  following  we  focus  on  Europe.
9 
Admittedly,  Heckscher‐Ohlin  gains  from  trade  were  also  conceptually  unknown  to 
contemporaneous observers and decision‐makers. Nevertheless, we can assume that they were 
                                                       












Table 2a: Denmark’s main exports (1865, Mio. Rigsdaler) 
Item Value  Exported  to 
Barley, not milled  10.5  England (53%), Norway (30%), Slesvig/Holstein (10%) 
Butter  4.0  England (63%), Norway (20%), Slesvig/Holstein (11%) 
Wheat, not milled  3.5  England (68%), Slesvig/Holstein (15%), Belgium (6%) 
Oats, not milled  2.9  England (81%), Slesvig/Holstein (13%), Netherlands (2%) 
Rye, not milled  2.6  Slesvig/Holstein (32%), Sweden (21%), Netherlands (21%) 
Bacon and ham (Pork)  2.0  England (55%), Norway (16%), Sweden (12%) 
Wool  1.8  England (66%), Sweden (19%), Norway (6%) 
Oxen, bulls and cows  1.4  Slesvig/Holstein (67%), England (21%), Lübeck (5%) 
Hides and skins, raw (not tanned)  1.4  England (35%), Slesvig/Holstein (26%), Sweden (16%) 
Seeds, Rapeseed and other oil seeds   1.3  Prussia (30%), Slesvig/Holstein (16%), Netherlands (12%) 
Wheat, milled (flour)  1.0  Sweden (60%), England (15%), Norway (9%) 
Horses  1.0  Slesvig/Holstein (57%), Hamburg (36%), Lübeck (2%) 
Seeds, other (neither oil nor linseed)  0.8  Sweden (95%), Norway (2%), Slesvig/Holstein (1%) 
Barley, milled (flour)  0.7  Iceland (36%), Norway (27%), Sweden (16%) 
Pigs  0.4  Slesvig/Holstein (73%), Lübeck (13%), Norway (6%) 
Train oil, cart grease, dubbing, etc.  0.4  Sweden (40%), Prussia (35%), Slesvig/Holstein (13%) 
Meat, sausages, entrails, and tongues  0.4  Norway (68%), Sweden (6%), England (6%) 
Peas, not milled  0.3  England (41%), Slesvig/Holstein (21%), Norway (11%) 
Spirits, which can be graded (Rum, Brandy, etc.), 
in casks  0.3 
Iceland (25%), Sweden (13%), England (8%) 
[“other destinations” 34%] 
Oil/Linseed cake  0.3  England (85%), Sweden (10%), Prussia (4%) 
Stones, raw (excl. millstones and grindstones), and 
articles thereof  0.2 
Slesvig/Holstein (63%), Lübeck (9%), Sweden (8%) 
Rye, milled (flour)  0.2 
Sweden (31%), East Indies/China/South Sea (26%), 
Norway (13%) 
Waste, other (neither oil cake nor rags)  0.2  England (66%), Sweden (12%), Hamburg (9%) 
Bones and teeth, raw, complete, crushed, grinded  0.1  England (95%), Sweden (3%), Netherlands (1%) 
Seeds: Linseed  0.1 





Table 2b: Denmark’s main imports (1865, Mio. Rigsdaler) 
Item Value  Imported  from 
Textile manufactures (including yarns), of 
vegetable fibres 
- Cotton textiles 
- Linen textiles 
- Cotton yarns 






England (57%), Hamburg (15%), Lübeck (14%) 
Textile manufactures (including yarns) of animal 
fibers 
- Woolens and worsteds 





Lübeck (33%), England (24%), Hamburg (21%) 
Wood, other (neither oak, boxwood, pockwood 
nor black popular), raw  4.9 
Norway (60%), Sweden (33%), Prussia (4%) 
Sugar, molasses, and syrup  2.5 
Danish West Indies (29%), Foreign West Indies (23%), 
England (19%) 
Wood, wrought  2.0 
Sweden (58%), Prussia (12%), Slesvig/Holstein (12%) 
Silk and Silk wares  1.5 
Lübeck (44%), Hamburg (34%), Slesvig/Holstein (4%) 
Oils and fatty oils (elaines)  1.1 
Russia (28%), Lübeck (16%), England (15%) 
Train oil, cart grease, dubbing, etc.  0.8 
Greenland (51%), Iceland (33%), Belgium (7%) 
Iron and steel, other, wrought (neither bars nor 
rails, plates, hoops, nails, spikes, anchors or 
chains) 
0.8 
England (71%), Lübeck (7%), Slesvig/Holstein (7%) 
Iron and steel, hoops and bars  0.8  Sweden (50%), England (46%), Slesvig/Holstein (1%) 
Seeds, other (neither oil nor linseed)  0.6  Prussia (28%), Lübeck (22%), England (22%) 
Hides and skins, raw (not tanned)  0.5 
Slesvig/Holstein (24%), England (22%), Sweden (18%) 
Horses  0.4 
Sweden (84%), Slesvig/Holstein (11%), Iceland (3%) 
Rye, not milled  0.4 
Prussia (75%), Russia (14%), Slesvig/Holstein (5%) 
Glassware  0.4  Belgium (69%), Lübeck (7%), Netherlands (6%) 
Wool  0.4 
Iceland (53%), England (17%), Slesvig/Holstein (13%) 
Seeds: Linseed  0.4  Russia (47%), Sweden (18%), England (17%) 
Hides and skins, wrought (tanned, tawed, etc.)  0.3 
Slesvig/Holstein (42%), Lübeck (26%), Hamburg (13%) 
Oxen, bulls and cows  0.3  Sweden (68%), Slesvig/Holstein (32%), England (0.2%) 
Fish: Salted herring  0.3  Norway (98.8%), Sweden (0.4%), Prussia (0.2%) 
Fish: Dried or salted  0.3  Iceland (46%), Færøer (42%), Norway (10%) 
Tanning substances  0.3  Sweden (53%), Norway (26%), Prussia (10%) 
Wheat, not milled  0.2  Sweden (79%), England (8%), Prussia (7%) 
Cheese  0.2  Slesvig/Holstein (62%), Netherlands (30%), Lübeck (3%) 
Iron and steel: Rails, ties, and chairs   0.2  England (86%), Netherlands (6%), Slesvig/Holstein (4%) 
Source: Values have been calculated based on the average quantities of imports for domestic consumption and 
exports of domestic production, respectively, in the fiscal years 1864-65 and 1865-66 from Statistisk Bureau (1865, 
1866); as Danish authorities did not report values or prices, these have been valued by prices for imports of 10 
 
corresponding items in Hamburg in 1865 (Handelsstatistisches Bureau 1866). Items of wood are potentially 
overvalued in the export tables due to guesstimates on the internal composition of broad items made for pricing. 
Trade statistics in neither fiscal year report detailed accounts on textiles, the breakdown in Table 4b was made based 






entering from  neighbouring  countries,  Danish possessions  (sugar from St. Thomas,  train  oil 
from Greenland, and fish and wool from Iceland), and in the case of oils and oilseeds, Russia. 





But  if  we  believe  the  contemporary  information,  Denmark  might  be  an  interesting  treaty 
partner for Sweden and Norway, especially concerning wood and fish (salted herring). Another 
candidate might be England, although the English market was far more important for Danish 





We  turn now  to  the possibility  of  tariff reductions.  There were  no discriminatory tariffs  in 










those  established  for  revenue  purposes.  Table  3  shows  ad  valorem  equivalents  of  Danish 
specific tariffs on articles that were either important export articles of the European countries 




Table 3: Ad valorem equivalents of Danish tariff rates (per cent, 1865) 
Category/item 
Wheat  0.0 
Rye  0.0 
Meals and Flours  0.0 
Wine  12.9 
Spirits  31.5 
Sugar  24.3 
Salted herring  3.9 
Raw hides and skins  0.0 
Wrought hides and skins (leather, etc.)  6.3 
Leather wares  4.0 
Wood and timber, unwrought (except from Finland)  3.4 
Wool  0.0 
Wollen yarn  4.4 
Woolens and worsteds  12.7 
Cotton yarn  3.2 
Cottons  9.5 
Linen yarn  4.7 
Linens  10.3 
Silk, Silk wares, and other high-value textiles  10.4 
Glassware  9.5 
Pig iron  0.0 
Bar iron and steel  3.6 
Ironware (rough)  7.7 
 
Source: Item-specific tariff revenues in 1864-65 and 1865-66 from Statistisk Bureau (1865, 1866) divided by values 
as calculated in notes to Table 4. For yarns and cloth, items in a broader category have been weighted by special 









that 25% of those textiles of vegetable fibres which are not identified as linens were of flax, hemp or linen. 

































entire  economy  (and,  consequently,  the  government  budget),  as  securing  of  equal  or 


































4.6  3.4  1.7  0.0  2.9  0.9  >0.1  12.5  8.5 
prohibite
d  0.0  1.7  3.6 
Butter  4.3 1.8  1.0  2.4  0.7  0.0  0.0  27.2  5.8  36.3 0.0  0.5  0.0 
Wheat 
7.2  2.7  4.0  0.0  2.3  0.6  >0.1  14.9  8.1 
prohibite
d  0.0  1.4  2.8 
Oats 
4.7 3.5  1.7  0.0  3.0  1.5  >0.1  12.7  9.7 
prohibite
d  0.0 1.7  3.6 
Rye 
7.9  3.9  1.9  0.0  3.3  0.9  >0.1  17.7  8.2 
prohibite
d  0.0  1.9  4.1 
Bacon 
and Ham  7.2 0.7  0.3  2.5  6.2  1.3  0.0  24.8  14.5  48.7 0.0  4.2  0.0 
Wool, 
raw  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.3  25.9  0.0  0.2  0.0 
Oxen, 
Bulls, and 
Cows  1.6 0.2  0.4  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.4  0.0  5.7 0.0  0.1  0.0 
Hides and 
skins, raw  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  9.6  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Rapeseed  >0.1 0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 >0.1  >0.1 0.1  0.0  >0.1 0.0 >0.1  0.0 
Weighted 
Average  4.5  2.4  1.5  0.6  2.3  0.7  >0.1  13.6  7.0  22.7  0.0  1.4  2.2 
Source: Specific tariff rates from Hübner (1866) in local currency converted into GBP using (Schneider, Schwarzer 
and Zellfelder 1991 and Nelkenbrecher 1867) divided by prices for imports from Denmark in British foreign trade 
tables (Board of Trade 1866). “Oxen, Bulls, and Cows” is the average of separate calculations for Oxen and Bulls, 
and Cows. “Hides and skins, raw” is the average of separate calculations for wet (salted) and dry skins. Weighted 
averages have been calculated based on Danish export values in 1865 as underlying Table 4a. The items in this table 
amount to more than 80 percent of total Danish exports as given in Hansen (1984, table 11). The weighted average 





Italy,  and  Switzerland  actually  applied  discriminatory  tariffs  in  1865,  which  were  based  on 
preferential rates for treaty partners, and non‐preferential (“autonomous”) rates for non‐treaty 
partners.  The  United  Kingdom,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden  and  Norway,  Belgium,  and  the 
Zollverein had generalised their preferential rates by the end of 1865, so that they also applied 










same  for  all  countries.































18 Denmark’s  most important  trade partners,  the  United 
Kingdom and the German states, had relatively low and non‐discriminatory tariffs, and the 
Zollverein  and  Sweden  both  lowered  tariffs  in  1865.  Because  of  this  Denmark  enjoyed 
remarkably low barriers to the export of her agricultural products. (Hansen 1984, p. 184) When 








in  1661,  1670,  and  1824,  which  actually  referred  to  non‐discrimination  in  shipping  and 










existing  quantitative  literature  and  theories  on  international  co‐operation,  we  make  use  of 
estimates of the determinants of cooperation in the Cobden‐Chevalier network between 1858 
and 1875 presented by Lampe (2009b). Based on Pahre’s theory of endogeneous trade policy 









Table 5: Determinants of bilateral MFN trade treaties, 1858-1875 
Variable  Coefficient  
(robust p-
value) 
Natural  1.14  (0.002)
dLLR  0.44  (0.082)
GDPs  0.23  (0.042)
dGDP  -0.67  (0.000)
MinTariff-1  3.67  (0.008)
MinPolity2-1  0.17  (0.000)
MaxPartnerPTAcoverage-1  2.56  (0.003)
Time  1.52  (0.004)
Time²  -0.15  (0.008)
Time³  0.005  (0.010) 




Source: Lampe (2009b, Table 2).  
Note: Dependent variable: Treaty (yes=1, no=0) between a dyad (e.g., Spain-Denmark) in a given year; Natural: 
inverse of log(distance); dLLR: difference of log land-labour ratios in 1857; GDPs: sum of log GDPs in 1857; 
dGDP: difference in GDPs; MinTariff-1: lagged bilateral minimum of both countries’ tariff rates in 21 commodity 
groups, weighted by the others’ export shares in these groups; MinPolity2-1: lagged bilateral minimum of both 
countries’  Polity2 scores (autocractic=low, democratic=high); MaxPartnerPTAcoverage-1: bilateral maximum of 
each countries’ treaties in force in the preceeding year multiplied by treaty partners’ import shares (excl. of exports 
to dyad partner) in 1857; time, time², time³: linear, quadratic, and cubic time trends; for details see Lampe (2009b, 
appendix 1 and 3). 
 
These  results  show  that  bilateral  welfare  optimization‐led  trade‐creation  considerations 
interacted  with  strategically  oriented  political‐economy  forces.  On  the  one  hand,  bilateral 
welfare  maximisation  resulting  from  a  potentially  large  common  market  formed  by  two 18 
 










logit( ) -4.81 + 1.14   + 0.44   + 0.23   - 0.67   + 3.67 Min( ) 




p Natural dLLR GDPs dGDP Tariff






















Table 6: Maximum predicted probabilities of treaty-making for Denmark per (potential) 
partner 
Potential Partner  Maximum odds (p) 
(and year) 
Austria-Hungary  0.13 (1875)
Belgium  0.37 (1864) 
France  0.12 (1875)
Germany  0.21 (1875)
Italy  0.23 (1875)
Netherlands  0.09 (1875)
Portugal  0.02 (1875)
Russia  0.02 (1875)
Spain  0.06 (1875)
Sweden & Norway  0.08 (1875)
Switzerland  0.37 (1875)
United Kingdom  0.06 (1875)
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